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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
CONNIE ALBRECHT, individually, and : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
on behalf of those similarly situated, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v
- Priority No. 15 
WALLACE R. BENNETT and DAVID D. : 
BENNETT, Case No. 20000714-CA 
Defendants/Appellees. 
DAVID D. BENNETT, 
Third Party Plaintiff, : 
v. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al, : 
Third Party Defendants. 
—ooOoo— 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the decision of the Third District 
Court 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The order from which this appeal was taken was entered by the Third 
District Court on July 17, 2000. The Notice of Appeal was filed on August 16, 
2000. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Appellant's complaint with 
prejudice where the Appellant's motion sought dismissal without prejudice in 
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light of reduced damage claims and had been brought in the absence of a pending 
trial or completion of discovery? 
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-940 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the trial court err in granting the Appellees' motion to suppress 
Appellant's subsequent changes to her deposition testimony where she had 
complied with the requirements for making changes and where the trial court 
misapplied Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by stating that a deponent 
can make changes to a deposition only to correct errors made by the Court 
Reporter? 
The standard of review is for correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 
777 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, PROVISIONS, RULES AND ORDINANCES 
The applicable rule concerning the second issue in this appeal is 
Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
At the time this case was filed, Appellant Connie Albrecht and a certain 
number of other women were involved in litigation with breast implant 
manufacturers in a federal court case titled Connie Albrecht, et al. v. McGhan 
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Medical Corp., et al (Case 92-CV-889). That case was located in the U.S. 
District Court, District of Utah, Central Division. 
On behalf of the Appellant, Mrs. Albrecht's lead counsel in the implant 
litigation, Robert J. DeBry and Associates (DeBry), filed this action as a 
potential class action in August of 1999. At that time, DeBry was attempting to 
settle the various implant claims in the pending federal court case. The 
Appellees herein, Wallace and David Bennett, had been previously hired by 
DeBry to assist as associate counsel in various aspects of the implant litigation. 
In June of 1999, the Bennetts were terminated from farther representation of the 
Appellant and the other women in the implant litigation. 
Notwithstanding their termination as associate counsel for the implant 
litigants, the Bennetts filed certain pleadings in the federal court action and 
continued to assert that they were still associate counsel in the case. 
This action was filed because of concern that the Bennetts' actions would 
destroy the settlement negotiations with the implant manufacturers, and thus 
damage or impair the implant litigants' claims. The concern arose out of strict 
confidentiality imposed by the implant manufacturers against disclosure of the 
terms of the pending settlements. There was also concern that the Bennetts' 
actions would expose Mrs. Albrecht and the other women involved to liability to 
the manufacturers if the Bennetts forced disclosure of the terms of the 
settlements in the federal court action or at some subsequent time. This action 
-4-
filed against the Bennetts included allegations of breach of contract, negligence, 
fraud and interference. Later, after this action was filed, and after some delay, 
final settlements were reached in the implant litigation. 
As time went on and because the implant litigation had been settled, the 
concern about damages to the implant litigants was significantly reduced, 
although not eliminated. The Appellant, represented by new counsel, in order to 
avoid the expenditure of further time and money determined to not seek 
certification of the putative class and to not continue with this case. Instead, she 
sought dismissal without prejudice. Such a dismissal would allow the case to be 
refiled later if the Bennetts in seeking disclosure of the terms of the settlements 
or of the amount of attorneys fees charged in the implant litigation caused a 
breach of the confidentiality agreements signed by the Appellant and others in 
connection with the settlement of the breast implant claims. Such a breach could 
result in the Appellant and other implant litigants being liable to the implant 
manufacturers for damages due to the breach. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
This case was filed in the Third District Court by Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates on behalf of Appellant Connie Albrecht on August 5, 1999. R 1-11. 
A Motion to Dismiss was filed by Appellee Wallace R. Bennett on 
September 3, 1999 on allegations of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, for failure to state 
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a class action and for alleged failure to state the real parties in interest, namely 
Robert J. DeBry and Robert J. DeBry & Associates. R. 15-17 
A Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and a 
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions was filed by the Appellant on September 15, 1999, 
although the motion for sanctions was later withdrawn. R. 40-55 
A third party complaint was filed by Appellee David D. Bennett against 
Robert J. DeBry, J. Bradford DeBry, Patricia LaTulippe and Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates on October 12, 1999. R. 82-121. 
On October 20, 1999, Appellee David Bennett filed a Motion to 
Disqualify Counsel against the law firm of Robert J. DeBry & Associates, 
Robert J. DeBry, J. Bradford DeBry, Patricia LaTulippe and all other employees 
or associates of Robert J. DeBry & Associates from representing the Appellant. 
R. 269-271. 
On February 11, 2000 the trial court entered an order denying the 
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss and taking the motion to disqualify the DeBry firm 
under advisement. All issues in the Third Party complaint between the Bennetts 
and the DeBry firm were found to be subject to arbitration. R. 616-619 
The trial court entered a Memorandum Decision on February 14, 2000 
I 
wherein the Court ruled that the Appellee's Motion to Disqualify was granted. 
Shortly thereafter on March 8, 2000 new counsel entered an appearance on 
behalf of Appellant Connie Albrecht. R. 620-625. 
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Appellee David Bennett filed a Petition with the Utah Supreme Court on 
March 2, 2000 for Interlocutory Appeal of the trial court's February 11, 2000 
order requiring arbitration of the issues involved in his Third Party complaint. 
Supreme Court Case No. 200000168-SC. This Court later denied the Appellee's 
petition on May 4, 2000 (Record at 808-810). 
On April 6, 2000 the Appellant filed a Motion in the Third District Court 
for a dismissal of the case without prejudice. R. 673-675. 
The Appellees took the Appellant's deposition on April 7, 2000 and 
thereafter on April 24, 2000 the Appellant made notarized changes and 
corrections to her deposition testimony on the correction sheets provided by the 
court reporter in her deposition. R. 748-752. 
On April 12, 2000, the Appellants made a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 679-681. 
On April 22, 2000 Appellant Wallace Bennett made a Motion to Compel 
Representative Plaintiff to Notice Putative Class Members. R. 714-717. 
On April 25, 2000 Appellant David Bennett joined in Wallace Bennett's 
Motion to Compel Representative Plaintiff to Notice Putative Class Members. 
R. 745-747. 
On May 1, 2000 Appellant David Bennett filed a Motion to Suppress or to 
Strike Corrections Made to Deposition of Connie Albrecht Dated April 7, 2000. 
R. 766-768. 
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On May 26, 2000 Appellant Wallace Bennett filed a Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Patricia L. LaTulippe dated April 21, 2000 that had been filed in 
I 
support of Appellant's opposition to the Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 880-883. 
On June 1, 2000 Appellant David Bennett filed his Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Patricia LaTulippe. R. 913-915 
I 
On June 26, 2000 the trial court heard oral arguments on the Appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss, the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Appellee's Motion to Compel Representative Plaintiff to Notice Putative Class 
Members, and Appellee Wallace Bennett's Motion to Suppress or to Strike 
Corrections Made to Deposition of Connie Albrecht Dated April 7, 2000. 
Following the June 26th hearing, the Motion to Dismiss was granted, but 
with prejudice rather than without prejudice. The trial court also determined that 
under the circumstances, notice of the dismissal was not necessary to the putative 
class in this action. The trial court also ruled that Mrs. Albrecht's subsequent 
changes to her deposition testimony were to be stricken and that the deposition 
should be filed as originally transcribed. This was reduced to an Order that was 
entered by the trial court on July 17, 2000. R. 1049-1055 and 1056-1058. 
Appeal was taken from that final order on August 16, 2000 when the 
Notice of Appeal was filed with the Third District Court. (Record at 1061-1063). 
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3, Disposition at trial court 
The trial court dismissed the Appellant's action with prejudice on July 17, 
2000. In addition, changes to the deposition transcript of the April 7, 2000 
deposition of Appellant Connie Albrecht were ordered stricken by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Connie Albrecht was the lead plaintiff in breast implant 
litigation filed against various implant manufacturers. The case, filed in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah was titled Connie Albrecht, 
et al. v. McGhan Medical Corp., et al (Case No. 92-CV-889). 
In about 1992, Appellees Wallace R. Bennett and David D. Bennett were 
employed by Robert J. DeBry and Associates to work as associate counsel to 
consult with or assist the DeBry firm in various matters in the litigation. 
The Bennetts' employment was terminated on or about June 2, 1999. 
Notwithstanding this termination, the Bennetts continued to represent to the 
federal court and to others that they continued to represent Mrs. Albrecht and the 
other women involved in the implant litigation. R. 737-741. 
In this regard, the Bennetts filed certain pleadings in the federal action 
without the approval of lead counsel, the DeBry firm. They sought an accounting 
of the amounts involved in all of the implant settlements because, among other 
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things, they were in a dispute with the DeBry firm over attorneys fees that they 
claimed were due them for implant settlements. R. 737-741. 
These actions raised great concern about whether the Bennetts' actions 
would undermine or destroy the then ongoing settlement negotiations which the 
DeBry firm was undertaking with one of the implant manufacturers. This 
concern arose in part because of the strict confidentiality being demanded by the 
implant manufacturer as part of the terms of any settlement. This confidentiality 
as to settlement amounts was, in varying degrees, a part of all other settlements 
that had been achieved by the DeBry firm with other implant manufacturers in 
the past. There was also concern that Mrs. Albrecht and the other women 
involved could be subjected to liability for breach of the confidentiality 
agreements if the Bennetts succeeded in their actions to reveal the settlement 
amounts. (Record at 737-741). 
The complaint as filed on August 5, 1999 sought preliminary and 
injunctive relief enjoining the Bennetts from continuing to represent that they 
were authorized to represent the implant plaintiffs in the federal court action. 
The complaint also sought, among other things, special and general damages in 
amounts to be established at trial. (R. 8). 
Settlements with the implant manufacturer were later reached by the 
DeBry firm after what amounted to delay of four to six weeks due to the 
Bennetts' actions. (R. 740-741). 
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The Summons and Complaint were served on Wallace Bennett on August 
20, 1999 and two weeks later Mr. Bennett filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R. 12-14 
and 15-17). 
On October 12,1999 Appellee David Bennett filed a Third Party 
Complaint in this matter that was directed against the DeBry firm and attorneys 
in the firm who had been involved in the implant litigation. The Third Party 
complaint is not premised upon whether the DeBry firm might be liable to Third 
Party Plaintiff David Bennett for all or part of Mrs. Albrecht's claim against 
him, although it does contain allegations to that effect. Rather the Third Party 
complaint primarily sought damages for alleged unpaid attorneys fees and related 
damages that Mr. Bennett claimed due following the Bennetts being terminated 
from further representation of Mrs. Albrecht and the other implant claimants in 
June of 1999. (R.82-120). 
On October 20, 1999, David Bennett made a motion to disqualify the 
DeBry firm and the attorneys in the firm from further representation of Mrs. 
Albrecht and the other implant claimants because of an alleged conflict of 
interest. (R. 269-275). The trial court later granted that motion and as a result, 
the Appellant's current counsel entered an appearance in March of 2000 and 
undertook representation of her in this matter. 
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Mrs. Albrecht on April 6, 2000 was 
supported by her affidavit. She declared the main reason for wanting to dismiss 
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the case was because she considered her damages from the Bennetts' actions to 
be minimal and hence it was not economically nor emotionally feasible to 
continue with the case. (R. 677). 
Her deposition had been previously scheduled by Mr. Bennett and she 
appeared on April 7, 2000 at her deposition. 
During her deposition, she denied giving the DeBry firm authorization to 
file this action against the Bennetts. (Deposition of Connie Albrecht, page 16, 
line 25; page 17, lines 5,6; page 22, line 12 ). She also stated that she first 
knew about the action only a few months before the deposition (Deposition of 
Albrecht, page 17, lines 8-10). She also stated that she didn't remember when 
I 
the last implant settlement was reached. (Deposition of Albrecht, page 13, line 
14). Mrs. Albrecht's corrections to her deposition are contained on 4 Vi pages 
on a form provided by the court reporter. In addition to making corrections, she 
explained on the form the reasons for the changes. It was signed by Mrs. 
Albrecht and notarized on April 24, 2000. (R. 748-752). She also explained the 
reasons for the changes in a separate affidavit filed with the trial court on April 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT'S 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE WHERE THE APPELLANT'S MOTION 
SOUGHT DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN LIGHT OF REDUCED 
DAMAGE CLAIMS AND HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
PENDING TRIAL AND COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY 
The trial court judge in his Memorandum Decision and resulting order 
held that the case of Albrecht v. Bennett was to be dismissed with prejudice. 
The basis for the decision, as stated by the trial court judge was: 
Turning first to the motion to dismiss, where the defense is ready 
to proceed and wishes to proceed to a conclusion on the merits, it 
is proper to attach the condition that the dismissal be with prejudice 
when the plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss under Rule 41. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson, 563 P.2d 185, 186 
(Utah 1977). In this case, defendants have vigorously defended the 
claims of damage asserted by the plaintiff's complaint. Indeed, 
both defendants were prepared to go forward on their motion for 
summary judgment if the motion to dismiss was denied. Based 
upon the foregoing, as well as the history of this case, the Court is 
persuaded dismissal with prejudice is warranted. 
(Record at 1050). 
Mrs. Albrecht sought a voluntary dismissal of her case without 
prejudice. It was an abuse of discretion for the court to dismiss the case with 
prejudice. 
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The trial court cited the case of Murray First Thrift & Loan v. Benson, 
563 P.2d 185, 186 (Utah 1977) in support of the decision to dismiss with 
prejudice because the defense was ready to proceed and wished to proceed to a 
conclusion on the merits despite the plaintiffs desire to dismiss the case. 
That case is distinguishable from the present matter in very important 
ways. In the Murray First Thrift matter, the case was sixteen months in 
preparation. The trial of the case was in progress: the parties were all in 
attendance, a jury had been impaneled and opening arguments had been made. 
During a recess, the plaintiff asked that certain counts against a third party 
defendant to be dismissed without prejudice because the plaintiff had settled with 
the main defendant and was not ready to proceed against the third party 
defendant. It admitted such to the court. For those reasons, the court dismissed 
the requested counts with prejudice. 
In this case, although the case had been filed some seven months before 
the Motion to Dismiss was filed, very little discovery had been conducted. The 
only formal discovery involved the taking of Mrs. Albrecht's deposition. Had 
no motion to dismiss been made by Mrs. Albrecht, there would have been 
extensive discovery required on both sides to prepare the case for trial. Much 
more money and time would have been expended. 
Further, the dismissal was requested not because the Appellant didn't 
have a case or wasn't ready for trial. Rather, it was because the present claim 
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for damages had been significantly reduced because the breast implant claims in 
the federal litigation had been successfully resolved after the suit was filed. 
There were damages due to delay in reaching the settlements, but at this time, it 
was not deemed worth taking the court's time and resources to pursue it. 
Rather, Mrs. Albrecht wished to dismiss but reserve her claims in the event the 
Bennetts took farther actions in concert with their earlier actions to force 
disclosure of the confidential settlements of the implant cases, with the risk of 
substantial liability for breach of the confidentiality agreement she signed when 
settling her implant case. 
The trial court did not consider this. 
Were the trial court to have denied the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, the 
Appellant anticipated further defending against the Bennett's subsequent Motion 
for Summary Judgment and then preparing to take the matter to trial, as would 
have been her right. Under the circumstances, it was a clear abuse of discretion 
to dismiss the case with prejudice. The trial court should be directed to enter a 
dismissal without prejudice, thus preserving Mrs. Albrecht's rights. 
To rule otherwise is tantamount to a Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, involuntary dismissal, which is premised primarily upon a failure to 
prosecute or a failure to comply with the rules or any order of the court. There 
is nothing in the record suggestive of any action on the part of the Appellant that 
would justify such a drastic result. 
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Mrs. Albrecht sought a dismissal without prejudice to avoid additional 
expenses and time for all parties, but to preserve her rights in the event it 
became appropriate to refile the action and proceed. 
The trial court's ruling should be overturned and the dismissal 
entered without prejudice. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEES' 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS APPELLANT'S SUBSEQUENT CHANGES TO 
HER DEPOSITION TESTIMONY WHERE SHE HAD COMPLIED WITH 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MAKING CHANGES AND WHERE THE 
TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED RULE 30(E), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, BY STATING THAT A DEPONENT CAN MAKE 
CHANGES TO A DEPOSITION ONLY TO CORRECT ERRORS MADE 
BY THE COURT REPORTER. 
Mrs. Albrecht made various changes and corrections to her April 7, 2000 
deposition. On the correction sheet itself she stated the basic reason for the 
changes: 
The changes on the following pages are made because due to 
nervousness, confusion and lack of memory, I didn't answer a lot 
of questions correctly at my deposition. I have since reviewed 
documents and letters previously provided by my attorney and that 
has helped me make these changes and corrections. I apologize for 
any inconvenience caused by all this. 
4-24-2000 
(signed) Connie Albrecht 
(R. 748 ). 
The Bennetts each filed motions and memoranda in support of the motions 
to suppress or strike the corrections made by Mrs. Albrecht to her deposition. 
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The Appellant resisted the motions and offered to bear the expense of a 
subsequent deposition at an appropriate time to allow for her to give testimony to 
further explain the changes she had made to her original deposition. 
The trial court granted the Bennetts' motion to strike or suppress. In 
support of this, the court stated: 
The purpose of this rule (Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) is to allow corrections of substantive or typographical 
errors made by the reporter. See e.g. Greenway v. International 
Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322 (W.D La. 1992); Wiley v. Brown, 164 
F.R.D. 574 (D. Kan. 1996). Rule 30(e) was not designed to allow 
the wholesale alteration of sworn testimony as attempted by 
plaintiff in this case. Accordingly, the changes to Ms. Albrecht's 
April 7, 2000 deposition are stricken. The deposition shall be filed 
as originally transcribed. 
R. 1051, 1052. 
The trial court erred in making this conclusion and applied the wrong law 
to the matter. 
Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure itself states: 
If requested by the deponent or a party before completion of the 
deposition, the deponent shall have 30 days after being notified by 
the officer that the transcript or recording is available in which to 
review the transcript or recording, and, if there are changes in 
form or substance, to sign a statement reciting such changes and 
the reasons given by the deponent for making them. 
There is nothing in the rule that limits or imposes parameters on what 
changes in "form or substance" are appropriate. The language itself is broad 
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and does not restrict changes to only corrections of errors made by the court 
reporter. 
While the trial judge may have applied the rule based on case law in the 
federal system or in other states, that is not how Rule 30(e) is applied in Utah. 
In the case of Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 11130 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals dealt with a situation where numerous substantive changes 
were made to a deposition transcript on correction sheets after the deposition was 
concluded. The issue there concerned whether Rule 30(e) had been complied 
with, a different issue than is before this Court. However, the language of the 
Gaw decision is helpful in resolving the question before this Court concerning 
when changes to a deposition transcript should be allowed. 
The court in Gaw stated: 
Initially we note that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e) is drafted 
very broadly to allow "changes in form or substance which the 
witness desires to make." Although some commentators have 
puzzled over the liberality of this rule...courts have generally not 
limited the number and kinds of changes a deponent can make. 
See, e.g., Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. All. 
1981) (mem.) (69 changes including many substantive changes_; 
Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 339 
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (34 substantive changes). But see Barlow v. 
EsseltePendaflexCorp., I l l F.R.D. 404, 406 (M.D.N.C. 1986) 
("manner and number of changes disclose a lack of good faith"). 
Thus, though defendants grouse about the kinds of changes Gaw 
made to her deposition testimony, that argument does not support 
suppression of the changes. 
Gaw. 
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It was error for the trial court to suppress Mrs. Albrecht's changes to her 
deposition transcript because they involved more than errors in transcription by 
the court reporter. While her corrections were substantive, she provided a 
reason for them and offered at her expense to reopen the deposition for farther 
examination. R. 748-752. 
An example that helps make clear her reasons for the changes involves 
questions and responses given during the deposition itself. Mrs. Albrecht, for 
example, was asked about the affidavit she signed in connection with her Motion 
to Dismiss. The affidavit is dated April 4, 2000. On page 49, beginning at line 
17, Mr. Bennett's counsel asked Mrs. Albrecht about the April 4, 2000 affidavit. 
In response she denied that she has ever seen it before. On page 50 she 
farther denied that she had seen it before and denied that she signed the 
document. At page 50, line 19 she was asked it anything in the affidavit was 
true and at line 20 she replied no. She denied seeing anyone on April 4th, 2000, 
the date the affidavit was signed and notarized. 
However, on cross examination, counsel asked Mrs. Albrecht about the 
affidavit in question. The examination proceeded as follows beginning at page 
61, line 24: 
Q. Okay. And I believe you said on direct examination you hadn't 
seen that before. 
A. Right. 
Q. - and you didn't sign it. 
A. I did and it was not - -
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Q. Do you remember - - excuse me. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember coming to my office on Tuesday of this 
week? 
A. Yes I do. 
Q. What time of day did you come to my office? 
A. I was there a little after noon, 1:30. 
Q. And did you review any papers with me? 
A. Yes, this one. That's why it threw me through that it was 
attached to the back of this one. 
Q. Why did you say you hadn't seen or sign it when - -
A. I just didn't - -1 just blanked my mind. I didn't remember. 
Q. Okay. Let's look it over now. Let's look at the first 
paragraph, is that correct, the first paragraph? 
A. Right. 
Q. And Paragraph No. 2, read that and tell me if it's correct or 
not. 
A. That's right... 
(See April 7, 2000 Deposition of Connie Albrecht at pages indicated). 
The cross examination continued as to each paragraph in the affidavit and 
Mrs. Albrecht verified that they were correct. 
The changes she made in her direct examination testimony are simply akin 
to what we see here. It shows she denied things out of nervousness, or mental 
confusion or lack of memory. Further, in a variety of occasions on direct 
examination, she did not answer the question asked, but answered something else 
not directly on point. A fair reading of the deposition and the changes made 
shows that the changes were consistent and not contradictory and that Mrs. 
Albrecht is just not a good historian. 
-20-
In Utah, subsequent changes to deposition testimony by a deponent are not 
limited to correction of typographical errors or the mistakes of the court 
reporter. For these reasons, the trial court's ruling striking 1he changes made in 
the April 14 2000 deposition of Mrs. Albrecht should be reversed and an order 
should be entered allowing the changes. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 
requiring that the dismissal of the action be without prejudice and that Mrs. 
Albrecht's changes to her deposition not be suppressed or stricken but rather be 
allowed. 
Dated this Z) day of January, 2000. 
PHILLIP B. SHELL 
Day Shell & Liljenquist, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant Connie Albrecht 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CONNIE ALBRECHT, ind iv idua l ly , 
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BENNETT, 
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and ROBERT J. DeBRY & 
ASSOCIATES, an unincorporated 
entity and alter ego of ROBERT 
J. DeBRY, 
Third Party Defendants. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Clark 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 990907903 ' 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
June 30, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and Wallace R. Bennett and David D. 
Bennett's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral 
argument with respect to the motion to dismiss on June 26, 2000. 
Following the hearing, the Court, ruling from the bench, granted 
ALBRECHT v. BENNETT Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the motion. The issue of whether such dismissal would be with or 
without prejudice was taken under advisement. 
In addition to the aforementioned, this Memorandum Decision 
will also address Defendant Wallace R. Bennett's Motion to Compel 
Representative Plaintiff to Notice Putative Class Members and David 
Bennett's Motion to Suppress or to Strike Corrections Made to 
Deposition of Connie Albrecht Dated April 7, 2000.1 
Turning first to the motion to dismiss, where the defense is 
ready to proceed and wishes to proceed to a conclusion on the 
merits, it is proper to attach the condition that the dismissal be 
with prejudice when plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss under 
Rule 41. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. Benson, 563 P.2d 185, 
186 (Utah 1977) . In this case, defendants have vigorously defended 
the claims of damage asserted by the plaintiff's complaint. 
Indeed, both defendants were prepared to go forward on their motion 
for summary judgment if the motion to dismiss was denied. Based 
upon the forgoing, as well as the history of this case, the Court 
is persuaded dismissal with prejudice is warranted.2 
^Although oral argument has been scheduled on these matters 
for July 31, 2000, the Court is not persuaded oral argument would 
be of assistance with respect to these motions, nor is such 
required pursuant to Rule 4-501(3). 
2In light of the Court's ruling granting the motion to 
dismiss with prejudice, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
is moot. 
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With regard to the issue of providing notice to the putative 
class members, the court in Diaz v. Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, 876, F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989) concluded that although Rule 
23(e) applies before certification, notice to the class of a pre-
certification dismissal is not required in all circumstances. 
After reviewing the record in the matter, the Court is persuaded 
this case is one of those in which notice should not be required. 
Indeed, no settlement was entered into and there are no statute of 
limitations concerns. In fact, it does not appear as though these 
putative plaintiffs have any chance of qualifying as a class.3 In 
sum, none of the reasons for protecting the putative class is 
present in this litigation. Accordingly, defendant's Motion to 
Compel Representative Plaintiff to Notice Putative Class Members is 
denied. 
Finally, with respect to David Bennett's Motion to Suppress or 
to Strike Corrections Made to Deposition of Connie Albrecht Dated 
April 7, 2000, Rule 30(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states: 
If requested by the deponent or a party before 
completion of the deposition, the deponent 
shall have 30 days after being notified by the 
officer that the transcript or recording is 
available in which to review the transcript or 
recording and, if there are changes in form or 
3It was undisputed during oral argument that only twenty 
five (25) women at most would make up the class. 
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substance, to sign a statement reciting such 
changes and the reasons given by the deponent 
for making them. 
The purpose of this rule is to allow corrections of 
substantive or typographical errors made by the reporter. See e.g. 
Greenway v. International Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322 (W.D. La. 
1992); Wiley v. Brown, 164 F.R.D. 574 (D. Kan. 1996). Rule 30(e) 
was not designed to allow the wholesale alteration of sworn 
testimony as attempted by plaintiff in this case. Accordingly, the 
changes to Ms. Albrecht's April 7, 2000 deposition are stricken. 
The deposition shall be filed as originally transcribed. 
Based upon the forgoing, the July 31, 2000 hearing is 
stricken. > / 
7 JttLy DATED this / day of-rJtme, 2000. 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990907903 
Judge Glenn R. Iwasaki 
This matter was before the Court on June 26, 2000, on plaintiffs motion to dismiss and 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff was represented by Phillip Shell. 
Defendant Wallace Bennett was represented by Daniel Moquin. Defendant David Bennett was 
represented by Mel Martin. Third Party Defendants were represented by Donald Holbrook and 
I 
Andrew Stone. The Court, having read the memoranda filed, and after hearing argument, took 
the case under advisement. On July 3, 2000, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision in the 
case. 
Based upon the said Memorandum Decision, and good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ordered as follows: 




The motion of David Bennett to suppress or strike corrections made to the 
deposition of Connie Albrecht dated April 7, 2000 is granted; 
The deposition of Connie Albrecht dated April 7, 2000 is ordered to be filed and 
published; 
The motion of Wallace R. Bennett to compel representative plaintiff to send notice 
to the putative class members is denied, based upon the Court's finding that none 
of the reasons for protecting the putative class exist in this case; 
The motion of plaintiff to dismiss her case is granted, and it is hereby ordered that 
plaintiffs case be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
Defendants motion for summary judgment is moot, and the hearing scheduled for 
July 31, 2000 is stricken. 
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Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
If requested by the deponent or a party before completion of the 
deposition, the deponent shall have 30 days after being notified by 
the officer that the transcript or recording is available in which to 
review the transcript or recording, and, if there are changes in 
form or substance, to sign a statement reciting such changes and 
the reasons given by the deponent for making them. The officer 
shall indicate in the certificate prescribed by subdivision f)(l) 
whether any review was requested and, if so, shall append any 
changes made by the deponent during the period allowed. 
